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Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern District*
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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____________
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____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER RENDA,
                                  Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
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District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________
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(Filed:March 8, 2010)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2DIAMOND, District Judge.
Christopher Renda challenges two special conditions of supervised release
imposed following his conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon.  18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
II.
We ordinarily review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).
When no objection is made before the district court, however, “review is for plain error.”
United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).  
III.
Because we write primarily for the Parties, we will summarize only those facts
pertinent to our analysis.
Renda was arrested following an investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”).  (PSR ¶ 3,7.)  ATF agents interviewed Ken
Fink, Renda’s former employer, who stated that Renda “had made threatening remarks
about various local officials and judges who had handled prior cases involving Renda.”
(PSR ¶ 7.)  Fink told ATF agents that “on one occasion, while [Fink] and Renda were
3driving together, Renda pointed out a residence which Renda said belonged to a York
County judge and indicated that he wanted to put a bomb under the judge’s vehicle.” 
(Id.)  Authorities subsequently identified the Judge as Sheryl Dorney of the York County
Common Pleas Court. (App. at 30, 36.)  The agents executed a search warrant for
Renda’s home where they found smokeless powder, fuses, and hundreds of rounds of live
ammunition.  (PSR ¶ 9.)  Agents also found books “relat[ed] to bomb-making, improvised
devices, firearms, and firearms silencers.” (PSR ¶ 8.)   
On December 22, 2008, Renda pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon.  18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1).  At sentencing, Renda objected to the threat
description in the Presentence Report, and “categorically denie[d] making any threat to
harm anyone.”  (App. at 31.)  The prosecutor acknowledged that because the Government
could not corroborate Fink’s account of Renda’s threats, it would not seek any sentencing
enhancements based on those threats.  (Id. at 33.)  The prosecutor maintained, however,
that “[t]he [PSR] is accurate and complete in that it notes those allegations are what
caused us out of a concern for the safety of judicial officers in York County and other
public officials to commence this investigation . . . .” (Id.)   
The District Court overruled Renda’s objection to the PSR, stating that
this is part of the story, the whole picture here, and I’m not going to remove
them from the presentence report.  I will, however, state in light of [the
prosecutor’s] statement that they should not be credited by the Bureau of
Prisons for the purposes of determining punishment or appropriate
institution or any of the other matters that might be involved in referring to
them.  (Id. at 34).
4The District Court was familiar with Renda, having presided over his trial for
weapons and drug offenses “in the early 80’s.”  (App. at 42.)  In imposing sentence, the
Court discussed why a sentence of incarceration was necessary despite Renda’s advanced
age (74) and poor health:
I feel bad for Mr. Renda and his several problems, but perhaps his health
problems can be effectively addressed by the institution to which he will go. 
In light of his history I do have a concern about recidivism and I also think
because of that history a punishment is appropriate, and so I am going to
indicate in my, that in my opinion the guideline range here is a reasonable
one and appropriate one.  In light of his age and his health, I will sentence
him at the bottom of that range.  Mr. Renda as we have said has been in
trouble many times over the years, and while he seems to have protected the
guns as much as possible, just the mere fact that he had them, with his
record, was a dumb thing to do.
(Id. at 42-43.)  The District Court imposed a sentence within the advisory Guidelines
range – fifteen months imprisonment and two years of supervised release with special
conditions, including:
The defendant shall be placed on home detention with electronic monitoring
during the period of supervised release, as directed by the probation officer. 
During this time, the defendant shall remain at his place of residence except
for employment, education, religious activities, treatment, necessary
shopping, or other activities pre-approved by the probation officer.  The
defendant shall comply with the rules of the location monitoring program,
and shall maintain a telephone without any special features at his place of
residence.  Payment of the daily cost of location monitoring is waived; and
The defendant shall [have] no contact or attempted contact with Judge
Sheryl Dorney.
(Id. at 6.)
 Although Renda did not object to these special conditions, he asks us to strike
them as unreasonable.  
5IV.
Because Renda did not object below, we review his sentence for plain error.  See
United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005).  To meet this standard,
“[t]here must be an error that is plain and that affects substantial rights.’” United States v.
Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
We will vacate a sentence only “if the plain error affecting substantial rights also
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
251 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583, a sentencing judge may impose special conditions of
supervised release, as long as the conditions are “reasonably related to the sentencing
factors set forth in § 3553(a), the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, and must involve no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public from
future crimes, and to rehabilitate the defendant.”  United States v. Mizwa, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20687, *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
Accordingly, “[c]onditions of supervised release must be supported by some evidence that
the condition imposed is tangibly related to the circumstances of the offense, the history
of the defendant, the need for general deterrence, or similar concerns.” United States v.
Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007).
6The District Court did not make separate findings regarding the special conditions
imposed, undoubtedly because Renda did not object to them.  The record nonetheless
amply demonstrates the reasons for the conditions.  See id. (“Where a sentencing court
fails to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a condition of supervised release or
the condition’s relationship to the applicable sentencing factors, we may nevertheless
affirm the condition if we can ‘ascertain any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the
record before the District Court . . . on our own.’”) (citing Warren, 186 F.3d at 367).  
Renda’s criminal history goes back to 1953, and includes three convictions for
weapons-related offenses, including possession of pipe bombs.  (PSR ¶ 24-28.)  At the
time of the pipe bomb incident, Renda also possessed a 9mm machine gun, a silencer, two
pistols, and two 22 caliber silencers.  (PSR ¶ 27.)  When they searched his home in 2008,
ATF agents found a small arsenal, including bomb-making materials.  Mr. Fink said that
Renda had threatened “various local officials and judges who had handled prior cases
involving Renda,” and wanted to bomb the car of a judge determined to be Sheryl
Dorney.  The record further confirms that as a York County Assistant District Attorney,
Ms. Dorney had prosecuted Renda, who subsequently appeared before Dorney after she
became a Judge.  (App. at 35.)   At sentencing, Judge Dorney stated that over the thirty
years she had dealt with Renda, she had learned that he “does not obey court orders. . .
[h]e does not obey the law.”  (Id.)  Judge Dorney asked the Court to impose supervised
release conditions that included electronic monitoring and prohibiting Renda from
7coming within a mile of her home.  (Id. at 36.)  The Government reiterated that request. 
(Id. at 36-37.)  
The Court did not bar Renda from the area around Judge Dorney’s home.  Rather
the Court narrowed the restriction, prohibiting Renda from having any contact with Judge
Dorney.  Although the electronic monitoring and home confinement are obviously
restrictive, Renda may leave his residence for “employment, education, religious
activities, treatment, necessary shopping, or other activities pre-approved by the probation
officer.”  (App. at 6.)  
In these circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court committed plain
error.  On the contrary, the record amply demonstrates that the imposition of special
conditions is “tangibly related to the circumstances of the offense [and] the history of the
defendant.”  Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144.  Moreover, the conditions “impose no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” in the circumstances presented. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
V.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
